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Abstract 
 
This chapter explores the unknown territory of a lost project: an ethnography of a public 
swimming pool. The discussion is contextualised within my broader sociological theory 
of ‘nothing’, as a category of unmarked, negative social phenomena, including no-things, 
no-bodies, no-wheres, non-events and non-identities. These meaningful symbolic objects 
are constituted through social interaction, which can take two forms: acts of commission 
and acts of omission. I tell the story of how this project did not happen, through the 
things I did not do or that did not materialise, and how I consequently did not become a 
certain type of researcher. I identify three types of negative phenomena that I did not 
observe and document – invisible figures, silent voices and empty vessels – and, 
consequently, the knowledge I did not acquire. However, nothing is also productive, 
generating new symbolic objects as substitutes, alternatives and replacements: the 
somethings, somebodies and somewheres that are done or made instead. Thus finally, I 
reflect on how not doing this project led me to pursue others, cultivating a different 
research identity that would not otherwise have existed. 
 
 
Introduction  
 
The research I didn’t do followed from another project that also nearly didn’t happen. In 
2007, I finally succumbed to a nagging urge to analyse a sporting activity in which I had 
been participating for several years, namely lane swimming. Until that point, I had 
managed to resist the temptation to theorise my personal experiences, anticipating – 
correctly, as it would turn out - that studying something I enjoyed precisely because it 
belonged to the world outside of work, would ‘take the fun out of it’ (Rossing & Scott 
2016). Eventually, however, I could no longer ignore the clamour of voices, images and 
meanings in this unique social world, and my curiosity won out.  
 
I conducted a modest and small-scale, retrospective autoethnography (Scott 2009a, 
2010), based upon biographical opportunism (Anderson 2006). Drawing on my own 
experiences over ten years, I recollected past memories and recorded new observations at 
one site, a public swimming pool in the UK. My data took the form of impressionistic 
fieldnotes describing the visual scene, conversations held and overheard with fellow 
swimmers, and interactions with the lifeguards, managers, receptionists and other staff. 
These were recorded in an ad hoc manner, not as systematic records of objective facts, 
but as more open-ended “mullings, questions, comments, quirky notes, and diary-type entries” 
(DeMunck and Sobo, 1998: 45). Taking a symbolic interactionist perspective (Blumer 
1969, Goffman 1959), I focused on micro-social patterns of behaviour, such as the 
regulation of bodies in space, normative rules of lane etiquette, embarrassment about 
near-nudity and attributions of rudeness (Scott 2009a, 2010). Recognising myself as an 
insider to the setting, who shared with my participants tacit knowledge and lived 
experiences (Hodkinson 2005), I embraced the subjectivity and bias of these 
interpretations, using my own evocative descriptions as a springboard for theorising 
wider social phenomena (Finlay 2002).  
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This preliminary study was illuminating, revealing some fascinating processes of self-
conscious identity work. I learned about how swimmers display and manage their 
embodied vulnerability in ‘unfocused encounters’ (Goffman 1967) with strangers in 
circumstantial co-presence (Scott 2010). I also gained insight into the normative patterns 
of rules and resources that create the appearance of interaction order (Goffman 1983) in 
this local social world, as well as how these meanings are negotiated, challenged and 
repaired (Scott 2009). This once mundane, familiar setting now seemed strange and 
extraordinary: the scene was vividly colourful, alive with meaning and bursting with 
material to document. 
 
Consequently, I had the idea of conducting a follow-up study over a three-month period 
of sabbatical leave. This would have taken the form of a traditional ethnography, 
involving prolonged immersion in the field, multiple qualitative methods and ‘thick 
description’ of the scene (Geertz 1973, Atkinson 2015). I was keen to explore the 
swimming pool as an organisational culture, by interviewing staff in all roles and levels, 
and observing the ways in which they interpreted, applied and ‘fudged’ institutional rules 
through the processes of negotiated order (Strauss 1979). I planned this research design, 
negotiated access with the appropriate ‘gatekeeper’, the manager of my local pool, and 
successfully applied for ethical approval from my university’s institutional review board. I 
responded to a call from the editors of a forthcoming book series (Vannini and Waskul’s 
Advances in Interactionism), and informally negotiated a potential contract. 
 
However, the dream second project never happened, for various reasons. The municipal 
swimming pool, which had been publicly run by the local council, got privatised. Its 
management changed, along with many staff, and I lost the personal contacts I had built 
up. Some of the long-serving lifeguards, with whom I was on friendly terms, left and 
were replaced by casual employees on temporary contracts, who had a very different 
attitude to their jobs. My position within the field changed, as I became increasingly 
detached from the institution as a social network; my insider status faded, and I was less 
able to call upon personal favours. I realised I would have to negotiate access all over 
again with the new management, and as this was now a private company, I suspected 
they would not be so amenable to the study. All of this created a time delay, until the 
window for sabbatical leave passed, and I lacked a sufficiently long stretch of time to 
immerse myself in the field. Regretfully, I filed the idea away in the ‘maybe one day’ 
folder, and turned my attention to other research. 
 
Aptly, however, one of these alternative projects that I have subsequently developed is 
‘the sociology of nothing’ (Scott 2018, 2019). This is an ongoing programme of research 
exploring negative social phenomena - things that people do not do, have, say, know or 
feel – and how these things affect our lives. Despite their ostensible non-existence, I 
argue that negative social phenomena have a reality and ontological status, which can be 
inferred through its indirect effects. We can trace and document the ‘social life of 
nothing’ as a relational, emergent process, following its trajectory from origins to 
consequences. Taking a symbolic interactionist perspective, I seek to understand how 
nothing is collectively accomplished, through meanings that are dynamically defined and 
negotiated with others. While this process unfolds situationally, as a series of 
contemporary moments in everyday life, it can also be reflected on and reconstructed 
with hindsight.  
 
This means that nothing can be formative in shaping biographical selfhood. Ricoeur 
(1984) suggested that life is lived forwards but remembered backwards, but the same 
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principle applies to the narrative construction of our unlived lives. We tend to author our 
identities with reference to positive phenomena – who we are, what we have done, what 
we know – but turning over the mirror, we find an inverse, parallel collection of 
experiences not had, which can be equally significant and meaningful. Our storied lives 
are haunted by the shadows of these negative phenomena, such as ghostly figures, roads 
not taken and missed experiences (Gordon 2008). Reflecting on these absent forms, we 
perform reverse identity work upon our undone selves, imagining the worlds they might 
inhabit. 
 
With this in mind, I tell the story of my lost ethnography as a negative symbolic social 
object: a ‘no-thing’ with a traceable social life. Despite its objective non-existence in the 
empirical realm of data, books and papers, this project has an ontological and pragmatic 
status within my subjective lifeworld (Schütz 1972). The project represents a series of 
events that did not happen, actions I did not take and knowledge I did not acquire - the 
cumulative absence of which has influenced my academic research career. In the 
following sections, I explore three questions: what forms of nothing were accomplished, 
how did this process happen through social interaction, and what effects were produced 
instead? First, however, I set out my approach and analytical framework: how and why 
should we research nothing? 
 
 
Knowing nothing: beyond the marked mundane 
 
Most social research investigates phenomena that manifestly exist. While this may sound 
obvious – true to the point of truism - it is merely a conventional truth, an axiomatic 
assumption so taken-for-granted as to seem beyond question. Sociology is traditionally 
defined as the study of ‘things’ – structures, processes, actions – that are present in 
society and have empirically observable effects (Durkheim 1895). Yet we can also infer 
an inverse, parallel set of ‘no-things’, which are less tangibly apparent and tend to go 
unnoticed.  
 
Brekhus (1998) suggests that researchers give a disproportionate amount of attention to 
the former, ‘marked’ phenomena, particularly those that are deviant, extreme or 
extraordinary. However, he argues, what is actually more prevalent in social life is the 
latter set of unmarked phenomena. These are objects and experiences that we regard as 
ordinary, regular and normal (Misztal 2015), if we notice them at all. Unmarked 
phenomena are grey and nebulous, spread across a vast, expansive landscape. This 
creates an epistemological blindspot in social research, a methodological bias towards 
figures above ground (Brekhus, ibid.). So focused are we on the animated objects and 
activities unfolding ‘where the action is’ (Goffman 1967) that we neglect to examine the 
surrounding background spaces from which these ‘things’ stand out.  
 
This is different from the argument that we need to study ordinary things. The sociology 
of everyday life has done much to address that shortfall of previous research, by 
examining the mundane, taken-for-granted rituals and routines that are normally ‘seen 
but unnoticed’ (Garfinkel 1967, Moran 2005, Scott 2009b). By studying the habitual daily 
practices through which situated realities are built, we recognise what people say and do 
in quotidian settings, alongside more liminal ‘non-places’ (Augé 1992), such as airports, 
stations and waiting rooms. Meanwhile, the sociologies of knowledge, science and 
technology (STS) have pointed to the kinds of research studies that do not get funded, 
carried out or ethically approved (Hedgecoe 2008, Hess 2009, Frickel et al 2010), as well 
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as the very unscientific social interaction context in which such decisions take place 
(Gilbert & Mulkay 1984). Yet the focus here remains on positive phenomena: somethings, 
somebodies and somewheres as latent forms that do exist, if only we could see them. 
Researchers in these fields examine why and how ‘things’ come to be ignored, denied or 
overlooked (McGoey 2012).  
 
I want to go further than this, by shifting the focus to a second type of unmarked 
phenomena: the nothings, nobodies and nowheres that do not exist, or never came to be. In 
my call for a ‘sociology of nothing’ (Scott 2018), I put forward the argument that such 
negative social phenomena still have an ontological reality, albeit only indirectly 
knowable, and are significant by virtue of not being there. They are relationally defined as 
the absence of positive phenomena (things, bodies and places) that are expected, noticed 
and marked. While their hypothetical shapes may be imaginable, as inverted 
representations of extant specifics, or known unknowns, often they take a more 
nebulous form, as unknown unknowns. However, this raises some difficult questions of 
ontology, epistemology and methodology: what exactly are phenomena that don’t exist, 
and how can we study “things that aren’t there” (Croissant 2014: 4)? 
 
 
The social ontology of nothing 
 
If nothing exists and is ontologically real, this logically implies a process by which it came 
into being. Nothing (in the sense I am using it) cannot come from nothing (in the 
conventional sense); nor can it lead simply to nothing. It is an inherently relational 
construct, defined in contrast to another, inferred presence. Linguistically, we designate 
nothing by the lack or absence of a signified object: something/someone/somewhere, or 
everything/everyone/everywhere. Thus Green (2011) makes a distinction between 
‘nothingness’ as the absence of something, and ‘nothing’ as the absence of everything.  
 
This is applied in the research domains of other disciplines. Nothingness is studied in 
mathematics, where the zero symbol denotes a specific quantity ‘none’, and in physics, 
where vacuums are filled with invisible energy, such as gravitational waves or magnetic 
fields. Meanwhile, in astronomy, cosmology and existential philosophy, nothing is 
conceived as an immense and infinite universe, which may be a source of awe and 
wonder (the night sky) or angst and terror (the realisation of our arbitrary insignificance 
as beings thrown into the world, who must confront the prospect of non-being) 
(Heidegger 1927, Sartre 1943). In social research, the equivalents of nothingness and 
nothing would be, respectively, specific topics we decide not to study, versus everything 
else we hypothetically might have done. 
 
The mutual constitution of these paired concepts reflects their relative value. Often this 
relationship is hierarchical, whereby marked phenomena are culturally dominant and 
preferred over their unmarked counterparts (Brekhus 1998), and the latter may be 
excluded from powerful domains of knowledge. Social forms of nothing are defined in 
relation to things that are more highly valued and whose absence denotes a problem. For 
example, asexuality is defined in a deficiency model, as a lack of ‘normal’ sexual desire 
and/or attraction (Scott et al 2016). By studying the unmarked, we can reverse this 
patterned ignorance, treating the neglect of nothing as epistemologically problematic.  
 
This affects both conditions and effects: nothing is socially produced, but also socially 
productive. Firstly, negative social phenomena have positive origins, emerging from 
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something or being produced by someone. They are created by what people do not do or 
allow to be. We can trace the process of negative formation through which what is 
affects what is not, limiting or precluding the things that cannot be. Secondly, nothing is 
positively productive. It creates the conditions of possibility for something else to exist, 
and adds a layer of interpretive meaning. This is what Hall (1993) calls the ‘constitutive 
outside’. Just as the background to a visual scene shapes our perception of it, so too can 
the no-things in our lives shape our apprehension of the some-things. Absent forms cast 
new light on their positively present counterparts, helping us to appreciate how these 
came to be, could have been otherwise, or might not have been at all. 
 
Telling stories about nothing, meanwhile, means imagining it in time as well as space. 
Non-done social research, as a type of undone science (Frickel et al 2010), can be 
narrated in this manner, as a series of events that didn’t happen. Yet this refracted 
process of ‘unbecoming’ (Scott et al 2016) is still rooted in the social world, unfolding 
through dissuasive influences that foreclosed potential happenings. We can imagine a 
temporal arc over which nothing extends, and through which it recurrently interacts with 
positive symbolic objects, especially people. Nothing’s relational form develops as a 
series of I-Thou encounters (Buber 1923) whereby its socialness may precede its 
individual essence. Doing, having or being nothing implies an ethical relationship of 
transcendent alterity, or infinite responsibility towards others (Levinas 1974). In this 
respect, we can compare stories of lost or never-done research to the existing genre of 
‘confessional tales’ about mistakes made in the field (Van Maanen 1988). Whereas the 
latter purge the soul by recounting the series of events through which something went 
wrong, the former perform a similarly ethical function of imagining how nothing could 
have gone right.   
 
This is a telescopic process, which collapses into itself. Memories and musings on the 
great undone haunt our lives from one direction, while wistful wonderings approach 
from the other. The temporal moments at which nothing happens exist in not only the 
present but also the past and the future, as logically, if not chronologically, 
contemporaneous points. Existentially, the fate of the transitory Dasein (being here, now) 
is wrapped up with its former and current states (Heidegger 1927). Metaphysically, 
nothing has an ‘eternal recurrence’ beyond its current moment, radiating, resonating and 
reverberating in all directions and occurring at all times simultaneously (Nietzsche 1891) 
Thus we can trace the ways in which nothing ‘returns’ (Nietzsche, ibid.) pervasively 
throughout our lives by following its trajectory. Social research provides the tools for 
doing this: examining how nothing comes into being and fades away, through 
relationships, encounters and social interaction. But how accessible is this process to the 
researcher’s gaze? 
 
 
Bracketed backgrounds, unseen scenes 
 
Phenomenologically, undone research can be theorised as ‘nothing’ in Green’s (2011) 
sense, to describe the absence of everything subjectively meaningful. It represents an expansive 
background of things that we could have attended to but didn’t, because they did not 
announce themselves to us as viable objects of study (Husserl 1913). Affordance theory 
in psychology (Gibson 1966) teaches that certain phenomena attract our attention 
because they resonate with our values or motivations, suggesting to the perceiving mind 
how we might engage with them. This reflects the pragmatist philosophy of perception 
as a relational and goal-directed process, focused towards objects as tools that promise to 
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be instrumentally useful (Peirce 1877, James 1890). These positively regarded objects 
‘shine forth’ as being worthy of study, while everything else recedes into the background 
(Heidegger 1927). In the social world, the researcher’s gaze is attracted by those topics 
that resonate with their subjective lifeworld (Schütz 1972), and distracted away from 
everything else that lacks this meaning. The second order constructs (Schütz, ibid.) they 
generate to interpret marked phenomena perform the same work as lay participants’ first 
order constructs, in making sense of an otherwise undifferentiated stream of 
consciousness. To impose categorical order upon subjective experience, we must 
pragmatically attend to some things and bracket out everything else (Husserl 1913).  
 
Nothing is therefore an occasioned attribution of irrelevance. It is applied pragmatically 
to ideas and objects that currently don’t matter, and consequently aren’t matter. Such 
definitions are only matters of provisional truth: valid until they cease to be useful and 
effective. No-things we have hitherto ignored or not thought about suddenly appear if 
they prevent us from doing what we intended to, or alter our perception of what we have 
done. Dormant ideas are awakened and jolted into life. Suddenly, irrelevant objects 
become relevant, tools turn into obstacles, and meaningless ideas are redefined as 
meaningful. This occurs in academia, as now, when researchers reflect back upon their 
careers and contemplate the projects that they could have done. Sociological biographies 
have been reviewed collectively and historically (Platt 2004) but can also be rewritten 
individually, through diarised reflections (Back 2016). 
 
Unmarked social reality, as an alternative domain of study, therefore exists not in an 
entirely different realm, but rather alongside marked reality. It hovers in the background 
as an area of negative space, surrounding the phenomena we selectively recognise and 
engage with. It forms the mirror image of Merleau-Ponty’s (1945) ‘world of perception’, 
or subjectively embodied lived experiences, suggesting instead a container of unlimited 
potential: unlived experiences. These contents, the no-things, are infinite and uncountable, 
just as the borders of their terrain are unboundaried. They can be apprehended only by 
negative relational contrast to the finite and bounded world of the social research that is 
done. Within the constraints of our employment conditions, time, financial resources and 
embodied capacity as human beings with limited lifespans, there is only so much work 
we can do. On the other hand, there is an infinite amount of work that we do not do, 
material we do not study, and projects we cannot take on. Thus the phenomenological 
world of undone social research is a residual category of what is left behind after 
‘everything else’ has been accounted for. This implies a social process of (de-)selection,  
through which certain matters come to count, while others disappear. 
 
 
 
Accomplishing nothing: two courses of meaningful social action 
 
Taking a symbolic interactionist perspective, I suggest that nothing is an emergent 
product of social interaction, whose meaning is defined and negotiated between reflexive 
social actors (Scott 2017). Following Mead (1934), I argue that people act in relation to 
symbolic social objects, which they apprehend as negative phenomena: things that they 
reject, refuse, ignore, avoid or simply do not see. These attitudes of irrelevance, 
ignorance or wilful disregard suggest that such objects may hold different symbolic 
meanings (Blumer 1969). As Sartre (1943) argued, consciousness must take an object: the 
subject is conscious of something, even if that something is unknown or intangible. It is 
only by someone not doing, having or being something positive that something else 
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negative, a no-thing, can come into existence. Meadian acts imply intentionality by self-
reflexive agents, involving four stages of perception, impulse, manipulation and 
consummation. In the context of social research, this would apply to the projects that we 
do not do (as objects) and the ways in which we do not do them (as sequences of action). 
 
Insofar as these actions unfold in situated encounters with others, are pragmatically 
coordinated and verbally or non-verbally communicative, they are not simply individual 
acts but social, or joint actions (Blumer 1969). They fit the Weber’s (1904) criteria of 
social action, being both meaningful to the actor and oriented towards other people. This 
process involves definitions and negotiations of meaning between social actors (Strauss 
1978, Thomas and Thomas 1928) who interpret each other’s symbolic gestures, for 
example when asked to give accounts of what we have not done and why. As Mullaney 
(2006) argues, when non-doings form the basis of identity display, they must be 
witnessed and ratified by an audience in order to be successful. The self that does not do 
something is relationally co-constructed through this performative narrative. In this 
respect, I argue that nothing is socially accomplished, through practices of interaction in 
everyday life.  
 
Nothing can be accomplished through two kinds of social action (Scott 2018). Acts of 
commission occur when we consciously choose to avoid doing, being or having something 
positive, motivated by attitudes of refusal, rejection or repudiation. In everyday life, this 
would include practices like taking strike action, being voluntarily childfree, or 
disavowing a gender assignation. In social research, it could mean deciding not to do a 
planned project, failing to secure funding, or redesigning methodology so radically that a 
new project is born. I call this form of action ‘doing nothing’, because it involves a 
deliberate, consciously intentional movement away from something, in order to cultivate 
something else. It is performative and demonstrable, insofar as that other, undone thing 
is communicatively displayed to others. 
Acts of omission occur when we more passively neglect or fail to act, ending up in another 
position by default rather than conscious intention. Actors do not feel strongly 
disinclined towards one option so much as drawn towards another, which holds more 
meaning. In everyday life, this might include agnosticism (not developing a religious 
faith), not getting involved in a leisure activity or not pursuing a career opportunity. In 
social research, the equivalent would be neglecting to study something that we 
hypothetically could have done, because it was less interesting or relevant than something 
else. These lost projects do not hover saliently enough upon our horizons of meaning to 
stand out as phenomena; they fade into the background as an undiffentiated mass. I call 
this form of action ‘non-doing’, to emphasise its lack of contrived performativity and 
reverse directionality.   
My undone study of the swimming pool involved both these forms of social action. 
Viewed from the final endpoint, the overall outcome of its non-happening suggests a 
process of passive omission: I did not consciously ‘decide not to’ do the project, but 
rather it ‘just didn’t happen’. This was mainly due to factors beyond my control, which 
seemed to happen to me, or external circumstances in which I found myself. These 
included the privatisation and new management of the pool, which changed its 
organisational culture, the lack of funding, and the passing of time, which closed the 
window of pragmatic opportunity. I also became more interested in other research ideas, 
which distracted and redirected my attention. On the other hand, I was not entirely 
passive in this process, and conducted certain acts of commission that made me partially 
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responsible for the outcome. My changing relationships with the staff and gradual 
withdrawal from their social network were processes in which I played a part: 
coordinated moves within a dance of joint action. Through tacit negotiation, we mutually 
recognised that it was no longer viable for me to hang around in the field, and that to do 
so would have been a breach of situational proprieties (Goffman 1963). There were 
additional things I could have done but didn’t, which might have allowed the project to 
happen after all. I could have more proactively sought to build relationships with the new 
management and personnel, and renegotiated access; the fact that I didn’t was a choice I 
made, even if subconsciously. Letting the time slip by until the opportunity had passed 
could be seen as an act of Sartean ‘bad faith’ (Sartre 1943), through which I failed to 
acknowledge my free will and take personal responsibility. Even if I couldn’t have 
prevented some of the external events that took place, I could have taken a different 
attitude to my situation (Frankl 1979), examining my conscience rather than blaming fate 
(Solzhenitsyn 1973). Instead of shrugging my shoulders and thinking, “Oh well, it wasn’t 
meant to be”, I could have recognised that “Thus, I willed it” (Nietzsche 1891).   
 
In the next section, I unpack this complex process by which something didn’t happen, 
while nothing clearly did. How did this project come to not-be, and what processes of 
joint social action were involved in creating this outcome? What negative symbolic 
objects does this indicate, whose existence may be imaginatively inferred if not directly 
apprehended? Unmarked social phenomena in the background of the research scene 
include knowledges not gained, events not seen or heard, and voices left undocumented. 
Yet these negative symbolic objects have a ghostly, absent presence, which agentically 
affected subsequent events. Thus we can trace how these non-doings, non-beings and 
non-havings led me to do, be and have other things instead. Undone research, like other 
forms of nothing, is productive: no-things create new some-things, as positive symbolic 
objects that would not otherwise have existed. 
 
 
Diving down: objects in deep water 
 
The things I did not find out are lost, and like the project itself, remain lurking at the 
bottom of the swimming pool. Occluded by the swirling waters of time, their already 
nebulous forms becomes blurrier and indistinct as they sink down into the deep 
unknown. Yet these drowned objects have an absent presence, as latent potential in the 
form of information, images and ideas that constitute hidden data. Agnotology, the study 
of unknown things (Smithson 1989), reverse-marks science’s normative conventions by 
abandoning the quest for absolute, objective knowledge in favour of a more tentative 
exploration. The great unknown suggests an infinitely large collection of negative objects 
suspended in an expansive territory, like buried treasures on the ocean floor.  
 
Together, these objects form a realm of knowledge, which has been conceptualised as 
nescience (Frickel et al, 2010), meta-ignorance (Smithson 1989), and the ignorance of 
ignorance, or ignorance squared (Ravetz 1993). This implies a prior process of 
production, involving social acts of commission or omission. Hence Beck (1999) 
identifies two types of nichtwissen, or non-knowledge: that which one does not want or 
need to know, and that which cannot be known (Gross 2007). Frickel (2014) similarly 
distinguishes between knowledge that is relatively absent (once present but subsequently 
lost) and that which is absolutely absent (has never existed). This in turn implies 
commissive or omissive attitudes of the researcher, who, for different reasons, may 
neglect unmarked phenomena. Croissant (2014) contrasts stupidity, a state of false belief 
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with ignorance, as the mere absence of relevant or useful knowledge. McGoey (2012) goes 
further in suggesting that ignorance, too, can be commissively produced by wilful 
blindness: a determination not to see. The constitution of such negative objects as 
‘strategic unknowns’, in turn, redraws the boundaries around what can and can’t be 
understood, cultivating the limitations of knowledge (McGoey, ibid.).  
 
The methodological recovery of these objects involves twin perceptual processes, as 
outlined by Husserl (1913). Some negative phenomena exist but go unnoticed, fading 
into the background of a scene. These can be illuminated and brought into the 
foreground by revelatory acts of ‘presentation’. Other negative phenomena are absent 
empirically but exist hypothetically, as unreal objects of phantasy. These can be made 
present in the realm of imagination, through creative acts of ‘presentification’.  
 
Using these techniques, and donning swimming cap and goggles, let us dive down to 
examine what is lurking at the bottom of the pool. Beneath these murky waters, I 
discover an array of negative symbolic objects, retrievable from three realms of social 
nothingness: invisibility, silence and emptiness. 
 
 
Invisible figures 
 
The things I did not see in this lost project include people, objects and events that would 
have existed in the field. Goffman’s (1959) dramaturgical metaphor of social life as 
theatre allows us to imagine these, respectively, as actors, material prop objects and 
interactional encounters, which together constitute a performed scene. Goffman 
describes the public spaces in which these plays unfold as the ‘frontstage’ region, which 
consists of both the background ‘setting and scenery’, which is fixed in place, and the 
‘personal front’ that actors carry around with them, displayed through their appearance, 
talk and manner. The roles they play are expressed through such items of personal front, 
including costume, props and demeanour: symbolic gestures (Blumer 1969) whose 
meaning is interpreted by the watching audience.  
 
At the swimming pool, these actors include the patrons and the staff, who perform 
before each other. Using Husserlian presentation, I would have drawn attention to some 
subtle but important aspects of their behaviour, such as how swimmers manage the 
public presentation of their bodies, particularly in dealing with the embarrassing 
predicament of being nearly naked before an audience of strangers. I would have taken 
fieldnotes about the techniques of self-presentation and impression management 
(Goffman 1959) that they used towards this end. These might include Goffman’s (1959, 
1963) concepts of civil inattention (averted gaze, pretended ignorance of one another), 
auto-involvements (conspicuously overplayed gestures of self-absorption, such as 
swimming with regime training cards, or vigorous soaping in the showers) and 
dramaturgical circumspection (being careful to control when, where and to which 
audiences one is exposed, such as attending ‘Women Only’ sessions).  
 
When observing the staff, I wanted to observe strategies of role distance (Goffman 
1961), whereby actors display a disdainful attitude, symbolically detaching their ‘real’ 
selves from the roles that they are currently playing. Role distance helps actors to convey 
that they are more than just their characters, and have a cynical attitude towards them. 
Lifeguards engage in acts of horseplay while on duty, for example chatting on the 
poolside or fooling around with the cleaning hose in the changing rooms. They also 
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modify their uniform in ironic ways to ridicule the structural hierarchy of authority, for 
example by rolling up their T-shirts or wearing name badges upside down. 
 
In terms of missed encounters between actors, I wanted to learn more about the pattern 
of negotiated order (Strauss 1978), whereby team-mates cooperate to stage a scene of 
unremarkable calmness. Goffman (1971) wrote of the importance of upholding ‘normal 
appearances’ to avoid ‘causing a scene’, as well as the reparative work that team-mates do 
to restore interaction order after a disruption. Using Husserlian presentification, I can 
imagine occasions of rule-breaking that I might have observed, along with the social 
reactions they would have evoked. These would include instances of ‘lane rage’ whereby 
one swimmer confronts another for swimming too fast, too slow or in the wrong 
expressive manner. Deviant acts like these are collectively managed by reparative 
interchanges (Goffman 1971), such as the four-stage apology sequence of challenge, 
offering, acceptance and thanks.  
 
 
Silent voices 
 
Next, we can consider aural data that I failed to hear. These would have included 
recorded conversations between swimmers, particularly friends who attend the pool 
together. Through such forms of ritual talk (Goffman 1981), actors mark their transition 
from one status to another: in this case from civilians to swimmers. Entry to or exit from 
the swimmer role takes place in backstage regions on the margins of the main scene, 
such as the leisure centre car park, foyer and changing room. The cubicles within the 
latter zone are particularly important as sites in which costume changes take place, quite 
literally, as masks are put on and taken off.  
 
Overheard conversations would be an invaluable source of data for understanding how 
actors manage this procedure. As Crossley (2006) found in his ethnography of fitness 
gyms, patrons often engage in ‘post-workout reflections’ as they discuss the success or 
failure of their progress towards goals. Similarly, I have often heard friends asking each 
other, “How was your swim?”, which starts a conversation not about the technical 
activity per se, but rather about how they feel about this part of their identity and its 
place within their lives. These practices are Reflexive Body Techniques (Crossley 2005), 
through which people act in orientation to their own bodies as expressions of social 
selfhood. Such data could be directly observable through Husserl’s technique of 
presentation. 
 
Equally, silence can be important when ceremoniously observed. Patrons get changed 
into their costumes more quietly than changing out of them, as if focusing in on the 
approaching performance. Lifeguards on the poolside are expected not to speak, as this 
would detract from their responsibility to watch the scene. They sometimes use the 
technique of dramatic realisation (Goffman 1959), emphasising or exaggerating a role to 
convey the seriousness with which they take it. For example, they will make a show of 
standing silently, gazing intently to express dutiful concentration. Swimmers use silence 
tactfully to disattend to the embarrassing predicament of their near-nudity, colluding in 
upholding the polite fiction that this is a ‘decent’ situation (cf. Weinberg 1965). Husserl’s 
technique of presentification lets us imagine how such things that are not actually said 
can still be vitally important. 
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Likewise, it is important to listen out for voices that are not normally heard at all. 
Goffman (1959) refers to the ‘non-person’ as a discrepant role, positioned in the 
frontstage region but outside of the performer-audience encounter. Domestic servants, 
janitors and bus drivers are examples of these roles, as ghostly figures in the background 
of the scene. The non-person is ignored: they are regarded as socially absent despite their 
physical presence, because their views are deemed irrelevant to the execution of the main 
scene. However, like Simmel’s (1908) stranger archetype, non-persons occupy a 
privileged position on the margins, from which they may critically observe the main 
performers’ action. Thus I would have liked to interview such service personnel as 
contracted cleaners and receptionists, who would no doubt have had different versions 
of the pool story to tell. 
 
 
Empty vessels 
 
Contemplating the depth dimension of a social setting, we can think about the empty 
spaces that surround positive symbolic objects, or from which they have been extracted. 
Like fossils, shells or ransacked boxes, empty phenomena acquire their meaning as 
containers of nothing, carrying their residue. They are the empty vessels whose contents 
have been spilled. Holes are wholly: filled with negative space. Just as in art, this 
background gives definition to the positive objects in its midst, defining its borders, 
shapes and contours. Marked figures stand out more against a plunging chasm, elevated 
from its depths.  
 
Taxonomically, I identify five different types of emptiness (Scott 2019), each of which 
could have been found in my research field. The void is a vast expanse of unbounded 
space that plunges infinitely down into the distant underground. It is totally empty of 
substantive matter, yet may be pregnant with latent meaning. Swimmers’ collusive silence 
about their near-nudity is one example, looming large like the proverbial elephant in the 
room. Bracketing out an alternative definition of the situation that poses a potential face 
threat (Brown and Levinson 1978) helps to turn ‘something’ potentially disruptive of 
interaction order into ‘nothing’ worth remarking upon (cf. Emerson 1970). What wealth 
of meanings were communicated by being left unsaid? 
 
The vacuum is a space left behind when everything else has been sucked out; it represents 
a complete depletion of energy and matter. This applies to how the swimming pool exists 
after hours, when everything has stopped and everyone has gone home. An eerie, 
darkened space containing nothing, this imaginary scene is reminiscent of Edward 
Hopper’s (1942) painting Nighthawks, which depicts three lonely figures in an otherwise 
deserted urban diner. The gauzy daytime colours of the interior are dimmed and subdued 
by the lack of social animation: no one is there and nothing is going on. I could not have 
observed this directly, of course, but merely imagined it through presentification. 
 
The black hole is the opposite: a field exerting such a force that it sucks everything into its 
depths, until they disappear from view. This might describe the experience of long-
standing staff, who feel exhausted, stressed and burned out. I would have liked to 
interview such employees about their changing attitudes to work over the course of their 
careers, particularly since the shift in organisational culture.  
 
The nuclear hole is the centre of an object formation, a core from which something 
significant has been removed. This loss occurs through acts of commission, such as the 
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death or destruction of something that once was there. The presence of this object is 
grieved and sorely missed, haunting the future of its survivor. Here, I would have liked to 
interview ex-professional swimmers who had given up on their careers. The local culture 
of the swimming club, once omnipresent in their lives through daily training sessions, 
would now be absent, and a core part of their identity missing. Sparkes and Smith (2008) 
write about the chaotic biographical disruption experienced by injured sports players, 
who must adjust to living without part of themselves. Similarly, I would have explored 
how previous pool regulars managed their process of role exit and negotiated a new ‘ex-‘ 
identity (Ebaugh 1988). 
 
Finally, there is the gap, a space in between other boundaried territories. Like rivers, lakes 
and oceans, their form is defined by its edges and borders with these other lands: the 
banks and shores from which they have been sculpted. The nothingness filling a gap may 
serve as an important medium of transmission, allowing movement between one place 
and another. Here, I would have liked to observe patrons’ behaviour in the 
aforementioned liminal zones (Turner 1967) of the car park, foyer and changing rooms, 
as they moved in and out of the swimmer role-identity.  
 
 
Lessons learned through non-lives lost 
 
Finally, I consider the effects of this non-project on my academic identity. Who didn’t I 
become through what I didn’t learn, and who did I become instead? Elsewhere (Scott et 
al 2016), I have introduced the concept of ‘non-becoming’, as an interactionally mediated 
career trajectory. Mirroring the established process of ‘becoming’ a positive identity 
through progressive commitments (Becker 1963), I posit an inverted sequence of stages 
through which we do not pursue potential versions of ourselves. Above, I outlined a 
series of omissive actions I did not take, scenes I did not witness, data left 
undocumented and relationships I did not build. These missed social encounters meant 
that I was unable to become a certain version of myself - ‘the swimming pool researcher’, 
perhaps, or a more generic ‘sports ethnographer’ – and be recognised as such by others. 
 
Just as nothing produces something, not becoming someone allows the possibility for 
becoming someone else. A void opens up, which we are quick to fill with different things 
that matter. New symbolic social objects come into being as substitutes, replacements 
and alternatives, which would not otherwise have existed if the non-doing had not been 
done (Scott 2018). As I pursued other projects, these ‘things done instead’ acquired 
significance as markers along different pathways to an academic identity. By not 
committing myself to becoming ‘the swimming pool researcher’, I was free to study 
more diverse and disparate topics (total institutions, stage fright, asexuality) under the 
broad umbrella of symbolic interactionist theory. Ultimately, I came to develop this new 
research area, the sociology of nothing, finding a niche that promises to become home.  
 
Wryly, one could say that I have learned nothing from this experience. What this actually 
means, however, is that I have discovered the paradox that nothing is something: a 
meaningful and fascinating conceptual phenomenon. This begs the question of whether I 
would still do the swimming pool ethnography now, given the chance. From my 
perspective of inverse dualism, seeing both positive actions and their negative mirror 
images, I can only contemplate this as a thought experiment about alternative realities. 
The lost ethnography hovers like Schrödinger’s Project in quantum superposition: 
simultaneously researched and not researched, with equal possibility. I could still do the 
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study, and perhaps I will one day, but for now I think I am content not to know. My 
suspicion is that this idea is best left in the box, untouched, where its limited reality is 
hidden and its latent potential remains perfect.  
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